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Abstract
Given the degraded profile of the refugee in contemporary 
discourse, it is tempting to seek alternatives from a rich 
tradition of literary tropes of exile. However, this article 
argues that the romanticized figure of the literary exile 
ends up denying, albeit in positive terms, a genuine refu-
gee voice, as much as the current impersonal hegemonic 
concept of the refugee as found in law. Ultimately, the spell 
in which refugees find themselves trapped today can be 
broken only by opening up a space of politics in which the 
refugee herself can be heard. 
Résumé
Étant donné le profil dégradé des réfugiés(e)s qui existe 
au sein du discours contemporain, la tentation de trouver 
d’autres possibilités d’approche à partir d’une riche tra-
dition de figures littéraires de l’exil s’impose. Cet article 
maintient, cependant, que la figure romantique littéraire 
de l’exil aboutit, bien qu’en termes positifs, à un reniement 
de la voix authentique des réfugié(e)s, au même titre que 
la conception hégémonique et impersonnelle des réfugié(e)
s que l’on trouve actuellement dans la législation. En fin 
de compte, le sort qui tient les réfugié(e)s prisonniers ne 
peut être brisé que par la création d’un espace dans la 
dimension politique qui puisse donner voix aux réfugié(e)
s eux-mêmes.
Introduction
The figure of the exile in literature, or the literary figure in exile is a familiar, if not in fact a hackneyed one.1 However, over the last fifty or so years, this tradition 
has died out. In its place we find, instead, the exile not so 
much as hero as victim; shamed rather than valorized; an 
object of history as opposed to being an active shaper of 
her own life and of the broader sweep of events. The refu-
gee is no longer a romantic figure, overcoming tragedy to 
triumph. In this article I identify two major reasons for the 
break between the exile literatures of the past and those of 
the present. The first is the post-colonial settlement, which 
has left us with a fairly rigid international state structure, 
demarcated with borders that are becoming ever-more 
policed and impassable. Previously migrants of all types 
had benefited from much more contingent spaces, that is to 
say spaces in which sovereignty was contested, often over-
lapping or in flux, and where there were little to no border 
controls. Second, the advent of the international refugee 
law regime has transformed the asylum-seeking process 
from one dominated by rival political or religious ideolo-
gies, in which refugees were often active subjects, to a highly 
bureaucratized process focused on categorizing and man-
aging the movement of migrants. 
In this depoliticized and delegitimized nadir of the refu-
gee, perhaps one place to seek out her voice is in literature. 
There is now a rich stream of writing on the relationship 
between law and literature, which variously seeks out law as 
described in literature, law as itself a literary form, and other 
parallels.2 It is sometimes claimed that whereas law presents 
itself as Truth, literature offers itself as an artful reflection 
of reality. Therefore, there is a space within literature in 
which the monolithic narrative of law can be ruptured.3 But 
equally, the relationship can flow in the opposite direction, 
whereby hegemonic legal concepts become reflected in liter-
ature and beyond into the wider culture. In short, as Kieran 
Dolin notes, works of literature “may question the bound-
aries established by the law, or they may simply reflect such 
boundaries.”4 So in this article, while attempting to show 
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how images of refugees are passed into literature from the 
law, I am also interested to see whether or not literature, in 
turn, creates what Edward Said has described as an “affilia-
tive” space, within which the refugee can be reimagined. In 
The World, the Text and the Critic, Said describes “filiation” 
as the adherence to a tradition—including “a party, an insti-
tution, a culture, a set of beliefs, or even a world-vision.”5 
“Affiliation,” on the other hand, is also an order, but one to 
which one consciously adheres. Filiation is an example of a 
“natural” or established order—filial, the father, etc. Thus the 
“filiative scheme properly belongs to the realms of nature and 
of ‘life,’ whereas affiliation belongs exclusively to culture 
and society.”6 The real problem arises when social orders are 
presented as filiative, and thus natural and fixed, law and 
the nation-state being prime examples, seen as inescapable 
facts of a well-ordered, civilized life. It is therefore the job 
of critical pursuits, whether academic, literary, or political, 
to intervene and disrupt in ways that are “affiliative.” Thus, 
in relation to the refugee, I am seeking here to interrogate 
the extent to which the pseudo-filiative subjects of law and 
the nation-state are reinforced or challenged within the 
supposed affiliative space of literature. I do this through a 
reading of three novels—Exodus by Leon Uris (1959), Shame 
by Salman Rushdie (1984), and Refugee Boy by Benjamin 
Zephaniah (2001)—that cover the period of transition from 
the refugee as hero to that of victim or threat.
From Hannah Arendt through to contemporary writers 
such as Liisa Malkki and Philip Marfleet, the role of the 
nation-state in the creation of the modern refugee subject 
has been clearly laid out.7 The “imagined community” of 
the nation, founded upon notions of belonging based on a 
shared culture, language, and space necessarily also pro-
duce the subject of an alien other against whom the nation 
defines itself.8 The twentieth century is littered with bloody 
examples of this phenomenon—the great “unmixing of 
peoples” following the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian Empires, the partition of India and Pakistan, 
the creation of the state of Israel, the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
What is interesting, however, is that in each of these cases, 
along with many others, the refugee subject had a dual 
aspect. For as well as being the alien other of one state, that 
negative image had a positive one as the human material 
of a new state. As Arendt saw, those refugees who had no 
connection with any state whatsoever faced the ultimate 
degradation. In the 1930s this was the fate of the European 
Jews, now it is the reality of the Palestinian diaspora. One 
interesting aspect of Exodus is the valorization of the former 
through their striving towards statehood. However, today 
the post-colonial settlement has, for the most part, closed 
off the route to valorization via the creation of new states.9 
The experience of most refugees today therefore is that of 
a “waste” product either warehoused in the archipelago of 
camps and detention centres or shunted around borders 
and seas in search of asylum.10 
Another fundamental difference between refugee lit-
erature then and now is that up until very recently the legal 
process played, at most, a marginal role in their narratives. 
This can be easily explained. Until the twentieth century the 
legal category of the refugee did not exist.11 One of the first 
encounters between the refugee and law that we can find 
in literature is W.H. Auden’s Refugee Blues. Written in 1939, 
this poem reflects the experiences of refugees in the age of 
passports, border controls, and the first abortive attempts 
at defining and ordering the refugee in international law.12 
Describing the experience of a Jewish couple arriving some-
where from Nazi Germany, the fourth stanza reads:
The consul banged the table and said,
“If you’ve got no passport you’re officially dead”:
But we are still alive, my dear, but we are still alive.13
The equation of death with lack of citizenship—civic 
death—is, with the exception of that other law-bound epoch, 
ancient Rome, a peculiarly modern concept. Only fifty years 
before Refugee Blues, refugees were able to move across 
Europe and gain asylum with few restrictions.14 Today, of 
course, the experience of reaching a potential country of 
asylum lacking a passport, visa, or other bona fide docu-
ment is a common one. So too the refusal of asylum for this 
lack is also all too common an event today. 
Just a few years after Auden’s poem we find a similar 
concern with legal documentation as a necessary pathway 
to asylum in the classic film Casablanca (1942).15 Daniel 
Steinbock makes an excellent case for the film as reveal-
ing the ideological framework that would, within a decade, 
determine the shape of international refugee law.16 Casa-
blanca preaches the morality of assisting the refugee to 
find asylum. Yet, as Steinbock demonstrates, there are two 
important qualifications. First, it is up to a decision-maker 
(represented in the film by Rick Blaine) to weigh up just 
who deserves asylum. Second, the image of the deserving 
refugee is one of almost unbelievable worthiness. Victor 
Laszlo is a political refugee from a criminal regime, whose 
character demonstrates almost no flaws. Instead he is 
repeatedly shown to be a man of the highest moral probity, 
unfailingly polite, speaking impeccable English, and always 
well dressed. This is all a far cry from the reality of most 
refugees from the Nazis, who were often of far less means 
and forced to skate difficult lines of moral judgment in order 
to survive. This is not to denigrate these or indeed any other 
refugees. The point is that no one is able to achieve the kind 
of uncomplicated goodness of a Victor Laszlo. It is telling 
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that such a fictional construct is necessary in order to earn 
our sympathy. In the age of refugee law, of judgment on who 
is or is not a genuine and deserving refugee, we must believe 
that the claimant’s credentials are of the highest standard. 
This type of characterization can be seen as closely linked 
to an equally flat and romantic construction of the refugee 
within refugee law. The legal category of refugee rests upon 
certain criteria, which perhaps have more to do with what 
we consider to be an ideal-type rather than reflecting the 
myriad reasons for forced migration. The 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention, which is the foundation of international refu-
gee law, insists that a genuine refugee must have left the 
borders of her country of origin, and that her persecution is 
for very particular reasons to do with religious or political 
belief, or due to her race, nationality, or social group.17 In 
other words, only those who have demonstrated will, the 
ability to travel, and usually some traits of courage and/or 
tragedy can be “genuine” refugees. So in Casablanca, and 
as we shall see, in Exodus, Shame, and Refugee Boy too, the 
affiliative space opened up leads in fact to a reaffirmation of 
the filiative categories of law. 
What should become apparent as we journey with the 
refugees at the heart of these three novels is that we have 
moved from one idealized trope of the refugee to another, 
neither of which captures the complexities of the refugee 
experience. The voices we hear in these narratives tend to 
ventriloquize for forces beyond themselves—the nation, the 
law—whereas the earlier literature of exile tended to focus 
on the voice of a single individual resisting the tides of fate. 
At the same time, the narrative structure of the novel does at 
least allow us a window onto the experiences of the contem-
porary refugee that is all too often obscured by the statistics 
and headlines that dominate the discourse on migration 
today.
Exodus: A (Nation) State of Being 
The Refugee as Hero … 
Leon Uris’s novel Exodus tells the story of the creation of 
the state of Israel from the arrival of the first Jewish refu-
gees from Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
through to the establishment of the state in 1948.18 Many of 
the protagonists are clearly presented as archetypes of the 
phenomenon of the Jewish flight from Europe, fleeing the 
pogroms and later the Nazis. The tale of the two brothers 
Jossi and Yakov who are forced to flee their home in Russia 
for Palestine in the 1880s stands in for the many thousands 
more who left the Pale of Settlement in the closing decades 
of the nineteenth century. 19 The tale of their three-and-a-
half-year trek to Palestine is described in the most heroic 
terms, as they trudge through snow, “bending their young 
bodies against howling winds.”20 By the time they reach the 
Promised Land they have achieved almost superhuman pro-
portions: “Jossi had grown into a lean and leathery giant six 
feet three inches tall with a frame of steel.”21 Karen Clem-
ent’s experiences mirror those of Jews forced to flee after the 
Nazi takeover in 1933, and their subsequent march through 
Europe. And finally, Dov Landau’s story follows those who, 
after suffering the degradations of the death camps, were 
then spat out into the displaced persons (DP) camps at 
the end of the war. These successive waves of refugees are 
referred to in Zionist historiography as the aliyahs. The first 
aliyah is often called the farmers’ aliyah, including those 
such as Jossi and Yakov who arrived in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century. “[The] Second Aliyah [1904–14] brought 
ideals and leaders and the Third Aliyah [1919–23] brought 
the pioneers—the German Aliyah [post-1933] resulted in a 
tremendous cultural and scientific spurt in the Yishuv.”22 
Thus each successive wave of refugees is celebrated not for 
who they are, but rather for what they will contribute to the 
founding of the nation. Heroic as they are, their identities 
are collapsed into the “national order of things.”23
Before we see the refugees themselves, we are introduced 
to them through the eyes of the British military officers in 
charge of a DP camp in Cyprus, where they are being held 
virtually prisoner in terrible conditions. The anti-Semitic 
officer Major Caldwell refers to them as “unruly” and in 
need of “some good old-fashioned discipline.”24 But Briga-
dier Sutherland cautions that not only are the DPs not 
criminals but that “they’ve got world sympathy on their 
side.”25 Later, when a boatload of refugees are on hunger 
strike demanding that the British authorities allow them 
into Palestine, a general orders that the whole affair must be 
handled with “great tact,” for “no one wants to ride herd on 
a bunch of downtrodden refugees … they have a great deal 
of sympathy on their side in high quarters … We want noth-
ing to happen to create an unfavourable opinion.”26 Thus we 
have a clear picture of the refugee as one who commands 
sympathy and respect from wider society, if not from the 
authorities. This solidarity, or at the very least empathy, is, 
therefore, what gives the refugees real protection and a cer-
tain guarantee of sanctuary, irrespective of their legal status. 
A political judgment on the refugee question, rather than a 
purely legal one, was still in play at this time, and worked to 
the refugees’ advantage.
A second important and rare aspect of Exodus that fol-
lows is the celebration of “illegal immigration” as a heroic 
act. Indeed the mass of refugees is conceived of as part of the 
Zionist army of liberation. “Illegal immigration … that is 
the way we will fight them,” says Avidan, the commander of 
the Hagganah.27 This is an accurate reflection of the Zionist 
project, which championed such immigration as a weapon 
against the Arab majority then living in Palestine, as well 
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as the British Mandate authorities. And it is this aspect that 
is crucial to the sympathetic portrayal of refugees in the 
novel, for the Jewish refugees are not fleeing their home-
lands but are returning to it. That is, according to Zionist 
ideology, they are returning to a land that is rightfully theirs, 
in order to build their nation. When Zionist agents break 
into a DP camp in Cyprus, they “set up schools, hospitals 
and synagogues, [build] sanitation facilities, and [organize] 
light industry.”28 It is the impact of a political ideal framed 
in terms of an identity rooted in nation that raises the refu-
gees to the level of a “civilized” community. Further, the 
camps are turned from ones of internment into centres for 
the eventual struggle in Palestine, with the Zionist agents 
training the refugees in military tactics, “Arab psychology,” 
and Palestinian geography.29 At the end of the novel the 
emigration of the Yemeni Jews to the newly created Israeli 
state is framed in similar terms. Initially they are “tragic 
figures … dressed in rags, filthy and half dead”; they are 
“semi-primitive people.”30 But on arrival in Israel they are 
cleaned up and introduced to civilization in the form of 
“motor vehicles, medicine, western dress.” In short, they 
really become human only with their subsuming into the 
modern nation-state. The final transformation of the refu-
gee Jossi into the heroic figure of the novel is his adoption of 
a Hebrew name—Barak Ben Canaan—and his insistence on 
speaking Hebrew instead of Yiddish. When his wife resists 
this, he responds, “Yiddish is the language of exiles. Yiddish 
is the language of the ghetto. Hebrew is the language of the 
Jews.”31 Thus, in multiple ways the illegal immigrants are 
ultimately valorized only through their role as creators of 
the nation-state. 
… to the Refugee as Threat
The contrast with the portrayal of the Arab refugees during 
the war of 1948 is stark. They are described in impersonal 
and faintly bestial terms. There are no individual charac-
ters drawn for us to give them life and a multi-dimensional 
image. Instead they are described as a mass “stampeding” 
in their flight from their homes. In Acre the Arab refugees 
resist in only a “half-hearted” and “feeble” manner. This 
weakness then spreads like an “infection” to other Arab 
centres.32 Repeatedly throughout the novel the Arabs are 
set up as a foil for the nobility of the Jewish refugees. This 
is done either by presenting the Jewish refugees as tragic 
victims, or as heroic nation-builders and cultivators of the 
land. Brigadier Sutherland describes seeing the Arab slave 
markets and hand amputations, and then contrasts them 
with witnessing the plight of the Jews in Belsen.33 When 
Jossi and Yakov arrive in Palestine, they find that the land 
has fallen victim to “a thousand years of Arab and Turkish 
neglect.”34 It will be the task of these refugees to “make the 
desert bloom.” Here the “host” community is othered, while 
it is the refugees who are valorized as bringing economic 
development and civilization. Amongst other things, what 
the Palestinians lack and what the Zionist project brings is 
the nation-state.
The climax of the novel is the achievement of statehood 
by the Zionists. And with this development comes a shift 
in how the figure of the refugee is presented. After spend-
ing some 600 pages lionizing refugees as heroes and har-
bingers of progress, a problem arises as to how to deal with 
the obvious issue of the hundreds of thousands of Arabs 
forced from their homes during the violent establishment 
of the state of Israel. Uris adopts a number of literary and 
political frameworks to mark out the distinction between 
the sets of refugees. First, the Arab exodus is dealt with 
not in narrative, not by describing the experiences of the 
refugees themselves. Instead, it is presented in the form 
of an Israeli government report prepared by Ben Canaan. 
This has the effect of creating distance between the reader 
and the refugees. Second, all the metaphors of backward-
ness are thrown at the Arabs—they are dupes played on by 
their leaders for their “illiteracy, superstition, and fanatical 
devotion.”35 Third, their flight is branded as being a result of 
“blind fear and ignorance” rather than of any genuine fear 
of persecution. Ergo, in the language of the law, as set out 
in the 1951 convention, their fear of persecution is not well-
founded. Fourth, their flight is described as being merely a 
political act aimed at embarrassing the Zionists. Here we 
have a sharp reversal following the repeated emphasis on 
Jewish refugees to Palestine being a politically heroic act. 
The difference is that the Jewish refugees are described as 
active subjects, whereas the Arabs are presented as objects 
in the hands of their malevolent leaders—“caged like ani-
mals in suffering as a deliberate political weapon.” Finally, 
the return of the Arab refugees is ruled out on the grounds 
that they would be a “hostile minority, pledged to destroy 
the State.”36 
Throughout Ben Canaan’s report there are remarkably 
few verbs deployed to describe the Arab refugees themselves. 
Instead, will resides almost exclusively with the opportunist 
Arab leaders, with the refugees as their objects. By contrast 
the contemporaneous Jewish refugees from across the Mid-
dle East are endowed with their own volition. The refrain 
of “they came from …” is alternated with phrases such as 
“walked through burning deserts,” “arose from the melahs,” 
“fought their way to …,” etc.37 The tropes of backwardness 
and lack of justification for flight are familiar to those used 
to the contemporary discourse on refugees. But for me the 
most striking element in this passage of the novel, which is 
itself an accurate reflection of Zionist historiography on the 
subject, is the stripping away of the political subjectivity of 
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the Arab refugees, as distinct from their role as objects of 
political strategy. Moreover, there is the arrival of the state 
as a supreme subject whose rights outweigh those of the 
refugees. The sanctity of the nation-state, even a nascent one, 
is asserted against the threat of the refugee mass. In short, 
Uris has used literary forms to frame the transformation of 
the affiliative project of Zionism into the filiative state. So 
here literature has been used to both open up and then close 
the affiliative space. The voices of refugees engaged in mak-
ing and shaping the world around them have been silenced 
in the face of the unimpeachable priority of state preserva-
tion. In Exodus, as in the actual historical events it describes, 
this phenomenon is presented in concentrated form. Key 
to this process is the encrustation of political and ethical 
notions of justice—e.g., the need for Jews to find safety from 
persecution in Europe, the right of Arab Palestinians to 
return to their homes, etc.—with a colder, more impersonal 
juristic view on their plight. The fact that the problem of the 
Arab refugees is dealt with by Uris using the literary form 
of a government report, and an emphasis on the threat to 
state security by their return, is emblematic of this legalistic 
turn. The reasons can be glimpsed at the very beginning of 
Ben Canaan’s report, when he describes the Arab refugee 
problem as “the most potent political weapon in the Arab 
arsenal”;38 echoes here of the British Mandate authorities’ 
concern that the Jewish refugee arrivals in Palestine had 
“world opinion on their side.” So long as the cause of refu-
gee protection is seen as just in itself, states find themselves 
forced to admit them. A recent example of such a phenom-
enon was the widespread sympathy for refugees crossing 
the Mediterranean, sparked by the shocking images of their 
plight hitting news bulletins and front pages, which pushed 
a number of EU states to temporarily suspend the normal 
legal restrictions imposed on their movements. The task for 
the state in such situations, therefore, is to delegitimize the 
cause of the refugees. One of the most powerful methods 
of doing this is to reframe claims for asylum in legal rather 
than purely political terms. Failure to meet the legal stan-
dard leads ipso facto to the illegitimacy of the claim and the 
perception that the problem lies with those seeking to abuse 
the system of refugee law, rather than those enforcing it. The 
judgment of the law is final, whereas in the political sphere, 
claims can be infinitely contestable. The extent of the fac-
tual inaccuracies and political prejudices that can be found 
throughout Exodus call into question its value as a historical 
novel.39 However, what it does offer us is a window on a his-
torical turning point in which the refugee hero of putative 
nation-states became the sinister and pathetic mass who 
threaten the nation-state order. The temporal frame of this 
change in Exodus covers almost seventy years, and indeed 
during this period the shift was incremental. Moreover, the 
novel closes in the late 1940s, on the cusp of the great pro-
cess of decolonization that swept the globe, and just before 
the laying down of the first comprehensive international 
legal regime regulating the movements of refugees. In the 
next two novels, we witness the effects and after-effects of 
these later events.
Shame: The Refugee Stripped and Revealed
The titular theme of Salman Rushdie’s novel Shame begins 
with the shame of refugeehood.40 The violence that accom-
panies the partition of India and Pakistan launches the 
infamous mass exodus in both directions across the newly 
created frontier. For Bilquis Kemal (soon to be the wife of 
Raza Hyder, loosely based on the real-life General Zia Ul-
Haq), Partition sees her fleeing from her home when a sect-
arian bomb blows apart her father’s cinema, and their house 
that lies behind it. The shawl that covers Bilquis’s naked 
body is burnt to mere threads by the force of the blast, and 
her eyebrows are permanently singed off her face. It is only 
as she has fled along with many others that she becomes 
aware of her nudity, and cries with shame. No one listens 
or responds, as they are all in panicked flight too. The strip-
ping of Bilquis’s modesty is offered by Rushdie as a meta-
phor for the exposure of refugees to the vicissitudes of their 
fate: “All migrants leave their pasts behind, although some 
try to pack it into bundles and boxes—but on the journey 
something seeps out of the treasured mementoes and old 
photographs, until even their owners fail to recognise them, 
because it is the fate of migrants to be stripped of history, 
to stand naked amidst the scorn of strangers upon whom 
they see the rich clothing, the brocades of continuity and 
the eyebrows of belonging.”41
The shame of Bilquis’s physical nakedness thus stands 
for the shame of the refugee stripped of all attributes of 
modern civilization—rootedness, community, and belong-
ing. Here we may pause to consider Giorgio Agamben’s use 
of the term la nuda vita (bare life) to describe the modern 
refugee along with all those others who have been stripped 
of the accoutrements of a civilized life, indeed of any life 
beyond mere existence.42 Bareness and nudity in Italian—
nuda—(and the French nue) are one and the same term. The 
nudity of Bilquis is certainly a source of shame, and that is 
how Rushdie adopts it as his metaphor. But bareness can 
also be positive—“the naked truth,” or as it is expressed in 
Italian, la verità nuda e cruda. The Oxford English Diction-
ary gives various definitions for bare such as “Stripped of 
surroundings, contents, property. Defenceless, unprotected, 
deserted”; “Laid waste, desolate”; “Without possessions, des-
titute, indigent, needy”; “Poor in quality, paltry, worthless.” 
But it can also mean “To make or lay bare, uncover, open to 
view”; “To disclose, reveal, make manifest.” In Agamben’s 
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work, we can certainly see both senses of the term at work: 
life stripped of any meaning beyond existence, but also a 
life that although seemingly at the margins reveals, uncov-
ers something fundamental to the hegemonic form of life 
created by juridically constituted sovereign power. Agam-
ben’s thesis echoes Rushdie’s evocation of the rootlessness 
of urban life when he describes the city as “a camp for refu-
gees.”43 Thus Bilquis’s nudity is not just her shame, but also 
a striking exposure or revelation of the refugee experience 
in the twentieth century. Her shame along with that of the 
millions of her fellow refugees, and the subsequent attempts 
to overcome it through the construction of a nation-state 
founded upon war and military glorification, will lead to a 
denouement where refugeehood is revisited, only this time 
as abject tragedy. Once again, just as with Exodus, attach-
ment to a romanticized figure of the refugee as nation-
builder will end with the transformation of the refugee 
subject into its flip side: pathetic victim.
For Bilquis, flight and her shame lead her to apparent 
happiness when she meets her future husband Raza in the 
makeshift refugee encampment. Here they marry “beneath 
the bitter eyes of the dispossessed multitudes.” Already 
Bilquis is trying to absolve her shame by rising above the 
embarrassing mass of fellow refugees around her. Their wed-
ding is carried out, “isolated behind [a] screen from the dull, 
debilitated anger of the mob … ‘Tch tch,’ she reproached the 
glowering refugees, ‘but this envy is too terrible thing.’”44 
The newlyweds move on to Pakistan—the “bright new 
world” of the new nation-state, of an end to statelessness and 
bare life. Indeed, Raza is able to offset some of the shame of 
being a refugee when his first successful military exploits in 
the war following Partition demonstrate “the advantages of 
the energy-giving influx of immigrants.”45 Here affiliation 
is key, the refugee an active subject of history. The shame 
of rootlessness is expiated by the founding of a new polis 
within which the refugees can rebuild their identities. They 
are able to do this through being the architects of their own 
subjectivity. But, and this is the crucial point, their revival 
as valorized subjects is inextricably linked to the nation-
state, as was the case for the Jewish refugees in Exodus. 
In response to the insult of “Mohajir! Immigrant!” 
thrown at Bilquis, Rushdie as narrator steps forward in an 
extended passage to ruminate on the migrant experience:
I, too, know something of this immigrant business. I am an emi-
grant from one country (India) and a newcomer in two (England, 
where I live, and Pakistan, to which my family moved against my 
will) … The anti-myths of gravity and of belonging bear the same 
name: flight … To fly and to flee: both are ways of seeking freedom 
… When individuals come unstuck from their native land, they are 
called migrants. When nations do the same thing (Bangladesh), 
the act is called secession. What is the best thing about migrant 
peoples and seceded nations? I think it is their hopefulness. 
Look into the eyes of such folk in old photographs. Hope blazes 
undimmed through the fading sepia tints. And what’s the worst 
thing? It is the emptiness of one’s luggage. I’m speaking of invisible 
suitcases, not the physical, perhaps cardboard, variety containing 
a few meaning-drained mementoes: we have come unstuck from 
the land. We have floated upwards from history, from memory, 
from Time.46
Here Rushdie expresses the dual nature of exilic move-
ment as both positive and negative, dreaming of flight, free-
dom, but also the emptiness, the draining away of identity. 
Partially this duality has to do with the blurring of the 
distinction between forced and voluntary migration. For 
those forced to flee, their hope is often limited to an end to 
the persecution or other dangers that they have led to their 
flight. But as Liisa Malkki, adopting the same metaphor as 
Rushdie, has written, “People who are refugees can also find 
themselves quite quickly rising to a floating world either 
beyond or above politics, and beyond or above history—a 
world in which they are simply ‘victims.’”47 This is recog-
nized at the climax of Shame, when Bilquis and Raza are 
once more forced to flee, only this time not to forge a new 
nation-state, but rather as is the case with most refugees in 
modern times, simply to seek safety. Here the description 
of their flight is raw, of little to eat, drinking water from 
dirty lakes, the constant fear of capture before crossing the 
frontier, and finally their vulnerability in their apparent 
sanctuary leading to a shameful death bathed in their own 
filth: “There is no country poorer than Escape.”48 Thus the 
duality of exile that Rushdie describes reflects both an older 
romantic exile familiar from literature—the Dantes and the 
Robinson Crusoes—for whom forced migration represents 
a journey of discovery, a figurative view from above, and 
also the banal realities faced by most forced migrants.
One arc of the novel is that from the heroic refugee 
who rises above the shame of the bareness of refugeehood 
through the construction of a new national identity to the 
refugee of today, deprived of any opportunity to reassert her 
active subjectivity, who must instead rely on the passive and 
precarious reliance on survival and help from others. What 
links the two ends of this trajectory is a two-dimensional 
subjectivity imposed upon complex characters. The roman-
ticized refugee subject whose flight becomes the basis of the 
founding of the nation-state is but a cypher for that political 
project. Once the project is completed, the rootlessness of 
the refugee becomes instead an embarrassment, an affront 
to the pride of the nation. And so, again, once the affiliative 
space has closed, replaced by the bordered space of the state, 
the refugee finds herself excluded and despised. A similar 
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trope is at work at the end of Exodus, with the depictions 
of the post-independence Arab Jews. Whereas once the 
refugee reflected the aspirations for a nation-state, in the 
post-colonial context she has, as Arendt and Agamben have 
identified, become a symbol of those who lack that ultim-
ate modern signifier of civilization: citizenship. However, it 
should be noted that with Rushdie, the opening and closing 
of the affiliative space is presented as what it is: a reversal 
in the fortunes of the refugee. Rushdie thus uses literature 
as a means to trouble and destabilize established notions of 
the refugee subject, whereas in Exodus the literary forms 
deployed are used to reinforce them.
Refugee Boy: Dehumanized by Law, 
Re-Humanized by Politics
Refugee Boy by Benjamin Zephaniah, published in 2001, 
represents a decisive change in refugee literature.49 The flux 
of decolonization, which allowed for at least some space for 
the heroic refugee in Exodus and Shame, has been replaced 
by the hegemony of the “new world order.” In Refugee Boy, 
in addition to the post-colonial context, a second and highly 
virulent phenomenon is also visible in the refugee experi-
ence: the legal process of seeking asylum. Half a century 
after the 1951 Refugee Convention, and in the immediate 
wake of a succession of pieces of asylum legislation in the 
United Kingdom, the refugee as shaped by and shaper of 
great historical events has given way to the mundanities of 
life in poverty, reliance on the host state for subsistence, and 
the legal process of refugee status determination. This effect 
is partly a result of Zephaniah’s hyperrealist style. But by 
the same token this realism accurately reflects a historical 
phase in which the refugee subject, as expressed through 
political discourse and legal structures, has indeed been 
stripped of her heroism and place in the making of history. 
Therefore, in this novel the struggle of the refugee has been 
shifted from the realm of world historical events to the 
much narrower space of law. The examples that we have 
looked at so far—the creation of the states of Israel, India, 
and Pakistan—have all passed into our collective con-
sciousness as epoch-making events. Moreover, the refugees 
in all these situations were bearers of hope for progressive 
change. In Refugee Boy, however, the refugee in question, a 
teenaged boy fleeing the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
is a product of a conflict existing at the periphery of con-
temporary globalized consciousness. Indeed, insofar as 
most people in the West register this region in their con-
sciousness, it is in the images of abject suffering and victim-
hood that were popularized by the Band-Aid phenomenon 
of the mid-1980s: “Do they know it’s Christmas time?”—a 
question that could be asked only about people seen as far 
beyond the borders of civilization. Of course, this problem 
of marginality is due partly to the endemic racism that per-
sists, even in our post-colonial epoch. Yet we do not have the 
same sense of distance from the refugee-producing events 
in Uris’s Exodus and Rushdie’s Shame, which also deal 
with situations arising in the Global South. The question of 
Palestine was dominated by the machinations of European 
powers, and the partition of India and Pakistan was related 
directly to the fall of the British Raj, and thus these events 
were intimately and obviously connected to the politics at 
the centre of global power. For sub-Saharan Africa today, 
systematically raped by Western corporations for its natural 
resources, but politically long-since independent from the 
polities of the West, the wars of the continent are in the 
collective consciousness there merely quarrels “in a faraway 
country between people of whom we know nothing.”50 Yet, 
as we shall see, while Refugee Boy represents in key respects 
a further qualitative move away from the refugee literature 
of the past, it still ends up cleaving closely to a romanticized 
refugee subject capable of being valorized within the dom-
inant discourse.
A central feature of the refugee experience today around 
which the narrative of Refugee Boy pivots, one that was 
either unknown or peripheral to refugees previously, is 
the grinding process of refugee status determination. The 
post-colonial absence of a grand political project of nation-
building leaves refugees from the Global South almost 
wholly dependent on legal definitions as justification for 
asylum. The juridical process has the effect of creating sub-
jects stripped bare to the essentials of the legal definition, 
and to the resulting passivity and dependence upon the host 
country. Legal categorizations, such as that of refugee, can 
be the ultimate in filiative spaces. In other words, questions 
of belonging and acceptance that were once the subject of 
contestation become objectified and fixed. Zephaniah’s 
novel powerfully evokes the feelings of alienation, confu-
sion, and lack of control experienced by the refugee as he is 
forced through the legal system. This begins when Alem, the 
eponymous refugee boy, makes his initial claim for asylum. 
After he is “photographed, fingerprinted, interviewed and 
given a number,” Alem’s hearing takes place in a “menacing 
building” that is “grey and lacking in colour.”51 Again, this is 
both an accurate description of a court building and figura-
tively a description of the cold impersonality of the law. This 
is then momentarily disrupted by an expression of humanity 
in the hearing by Alem himself. After the judge announces 
an adjournment and makes the perfunctory inquiry as to 
whether the applicant has anything to say, Alem shocks the 
judge and his own counsel when he wishes everyone in the 
court “Happy Christmas,” provoking warm laughter in the 
court and the judge’s cold mask to slip.52 When, some weeks 
later, the appeal judgment is finally delivered, however, the 
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judge deploys the well-worn legal cliché, “I cannot make a 
judgement based on emotions, I have to look at the facts,” 
before dismissing the asylum claim.53 This is after callously 
describing Alem’s mother as having been “hacked” to death, 
causing Alem to faint in the dock. What Zephaniah sets 
up in the meeting between the refugee and the law is that 
of the human before the coldly calculating, a theme that is 
repeated throughout the novel. 
The Return of the Political
It is at this point, the failure of the appeal, that the story 
shifts gear. From the cold grey scene of the court, the next 
chapter is entitled “This Is Politics.” Alem’s school friends 
argue with him that a campaign is needed so that he can 
stay. In the words of one of them, “There ain’t no justice, 
just us.”54 These words are emblematic of a true political 
subject, one who not only speaks but who does so not on 
the terms of existing power relations but on those of a col-
lectively self-constituted identity—“just us.” Instead of 
allowing the law to determine the borders of belonging, the 
community—Alem’s schoolmates, friends, foster family, 
along with the wider community in which he lives—expand 
it to include someone who in the truest sense of the term 
is “one of their own.” Alain Badiou has coined a slogan to 
express this political sense of community that cuts across 
national or legal distinctions: “Everyone who is here is from 
here.”55 The lines between “them” and “us” have been recon-
stituted. Instead of a host community/alien binary, we have 
instead the powerful against all those who are or were once 
branded as other. Alem’s friends present us with a range of 
these identities. Robert Fern reveals himself at one point 
to be really Roberto Fernandez, the son of refugees from 
Pinochet’s Chile. Asher, born in Britain to parents from 
Jamaica, self-identifies as a Rastafarian and thus describes 
himself as an Ethiopian “who just happens to be born in 
England.” Robert playfully picks up on this when he tells 
Alem, “All human life started in Africa, so I’m an African 
too … an African that just happens to be born in Manor 
Park.”56 Finally, Ray “Buck” Buckley comes from a family 
that “had lived in the area as far back as they could trace, but 
all he wanted to do was leave the area.”57 Buck is, of course, 
a typical teenager yearning to leave the confines of home 
and school. But here his typical adolescent angst makes him 
identify with others who are in other ways outsiders. The 
community around Alem is suffused with a cosmopolitan 
working-class culture based on solidarity—“Pithead,” the 
band name of Buck and his mates is a nod to the historically 
heroic role of the coal miners in the British class struggle—
and a shared self-constructed identity of belonging together 
yet feeling alienated from much of “society” as it is reflected 
in dominant discourses. Alem’s friends are thus a perfect 
example of Said’s “affiliation,” a conscious process of re-
presentation.58 Rushdie, in non-fiction mode, has written 
that all refugee/immigrant communities in England—from 
the Huguenots, through to the Jews, and more recently, 
those from South Asia and elsewhere—do in fact have a 
shared identity as “immigrant Britain,” a category that by 
its nature is constantly in flux.59 
Following the failure of Alem’s appeal, this community 
springs into action in defence of Alem and his father’s right 
to be granted asylum. Initially this creates a schism between 
father and son. Alem’s father rejects the idea of a political 
campaign in favour of allowing the law to take its course, the 
argument being that they have no right, as aliens, to engage 
in politics in the United Kingdom: “We certainly should not 
be getting involved in the politics of this country.”60 This is 
from a man so deeply involved in the politics of his home-
land that he has been forced into exile. The refugee, in other 
words, once outside of his country of origin, has a right to 
the law but not to politics. The distinction between “genu-
ine” and “bogus” refugees today is laid precisely on this line 
between law and politics, for those marked with the impri-
matur of the legally constituted refugee subject are allowed 
(up to a point), whereas those whose claim falls outside, 
based on a political claim or economic need, are forbidden. 
Zephaniah’s novel breaks through this oppressive binary by 
contrasting the long, grey, and inhuman legal process with 
the life and colour of the campaign for Alem’s right to stay. 
Alem, in response to his father’s insistence on respecting the 
line between law and politics argues, “Everything is politics 
… We are here because of politics, the judge is there because 
of politics, and we are being sent home because of politics.” 
Alem’s decisive argument with his father is to repeat the 
quote from his friends: “There ain’t no justice, just us.”61 
The campaign itself displays all the usual contradictory 
consciousness of those new to political resistance. State-
ments such as “As British subjects we believe that it is our 
duty to offer them protection”62 mingle with slogans of the 
type, “There are no illegal immigrants, only illegal gov-
ernments.”63 The rights of sovereign-constituted subjects 
confront the placing of legal judgment beyond the realm of 
the state. A further although undeveloped part of the nar-
rative is the drawing in of other refugees into the campaign. 
This is shown through the Palestinian Abbas, who turns 
up at one demonstration with a placard bearing the legend, 
“Refugees are human, let us live.”64 In this simple but direct 
demand rests an essential truth of the refugee experience 
today. Trapped in the one-dimensional identity of the legal 
subject, forced into a “bare life” of existence, there is the 
cry for recognition of themselves as multi-faceted political 
beings in the Aristotelian sense, as members of the polis, 
the community. A nice example of how the collective and 
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individual subject can interact to (re)construct active sub-
jectivities occurs at a protest for Alem and his father. Called 
to speak to the crowd, Alem at first resists, nervous and 
unsure of himself. Only after the calls of the collective for 
him grow louder does he tentatively take the megaphone 
and address the protest. In doing so, this refugee literally 
and figuratively finds his voice. 
The Romantic Subject
One seriously problematic element of Zephaniah’s novel is 
the portrayal of the central character of Alem, the refugee 
boy of the book’s title. He is almost too good to be true. 
Never once does he behave badly, become unjustly angry 
or rude. He is the most studious student one could imagine, 
reading up on the classics of English literature any moment 
he gets, resisting the temptations of his friends to smoke 
and act up. In spite of the trauma of having to flee his home, 
his mother’s murder, his father locked up in a detention 
centre for asylum-seekers, removed from his loving foster 
family and forced to live in a squalid hostel, humiliated 
by kids at his school for the gaps in his English, and all 
the other ritual shaming that asylum-seekers in the United 
Kingdom face today, Alem remains always calm and well-
adjusted. He charms the judge and impresses his teachers. 
His foster mother describes him as a role model whom 
everyone should look up to. This portrait, like that of Vic-
tor Laszlo in Casablanca, is idealized to such an extent that 
it dulls the contours of the character. Ultimately, Alem 
comes across as tragic and suffering yet saintly, Christ-like, 
the ultimate romanticized figure. Thus while the portrait 
is positive, it remains, like that drawn by law, an image 
of the refugee that is not truly human. As such he is one 
of the least convincing characters of the novel. One can 
understand that Zephaniah wishes to counter the flood 
of negative images that have swamped our collective con-
sciousness. But as a result we have a character who claims 
our sympathy on an unreal basis. Alem is the archetypal 
deserving refugee—hard working, intelligent, respectful, 
and uncomplicated. Any refugee lacking any or all of these 
qualities would thus be ipso facto undeserving. Asylum 
is therefore still predicated on the worthiness of the indi-
vidual, not on the duty to protect, or the right to sanctu-
ary. We are invited, once again, to sit in judgment on the 
refugee, even if that judgment is meant to be positive. Just 
as in the period of decolonization in relation to the nation-
building migrants, we appear to need our refugees to be 
heroes in order for them to be valorized or welcomed. We 
could, perhaps, see the setting up of an idealized refugee 
such as Alem as an attempt to create an affiliative space 
that could advance the place of the refugee in the general 
discourse. But the unreal nature of this central character 
unfortunately creates a narrative weakness that under-
mines this objective.
The problem in bringing the ideal to bear in critiquing 
reality was well described by Georg Lukács. The strength 
of the novel form, he argued, consists in the “problematic 
individual’s journeying towards himself, the road from 
dull captivity within a merely present reality—a reality that 
is heterogeneous in itself and meaningless to the individ-
ual—towards clear recognition.”65 This trope is similar to 
affiliation, as the protagonist struggles with her place in the 
world, seeking to remake her identity through conscious 
choices. Zephaniah presents Alem’s “journeying” in such 
a way as to challenge the reality of refugeehood. But the 
failure to adequately problematize him as an individual—
where “his aims are given to him with immediate obvious-
ness”—makes the transcendence of reality a function of 
idealism rather than a realist form of immanent critique.66 
It is important here not to confuse these terms. I use ideal-
ism and realism here not as literary forms, but in terms of a 
philosophical approach to how the dominant discourse can 
be challenged. Refugee Boy is written in a relentlessly realist 
register, in the literary sense. But ultimately it falls, through 
the central character of Alem, into positing an idealized pic-
ture of resistance. By contrast, in Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, 
for example, the revolt of the despised immigrant through 
his transformation into an aggressive beast both brings 
into sharp relief the bestial imagery that is projected onto 
the immigrant, while at the same time showing how the 
most base and animalistic anger is a necessary, if paradox-
ical, route back to reclaiming his humanity.67 Arendt too, 
in her essay “We Refugees,” reflects on the experiences of 
her fellow exiles from Nazi Europe and draws out all the 
complex, difficult, and conflicting pressures in maintaining 
one’s identity in a state of forced migration.68 The charac-
ter of Alem fails to present a realistic refugee voice, but he 
is truly emblematic of the contemporary refugee subject 
trapped between the tropes of the dehumanized legal def-
inition and the romanticized literary construct. Lukács has 
further argued that for literature to be successful it “must 
demonstrate both the concrete and abstract potentialities of 
human beings in extreme situations.”69 Potentiality is thus 
not about imagining some idealistic perfection, but neither 
is it about simply describing subjects just as they are. In a 
curious way Refugee Boy falls into both these traps—Alem’s 
travails are depressingly familiar, while he appears as a 
character occupying Malkki’s “floating world” of the refu-
gee as victim, painted in the most sympathetic of colours. 
Conclusion
Reflecting upon the literatures of exile, Said has written, 
“Refugees … are a creation of the twentieth-century state. 
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The word ‘refugee’ has become a political one, suggesting 
large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring 
urgent international assistance, whereas ‘exile’ carries with 
it, I think, a touch of solitude and spirituality.”70 Malkki 
comments on this passage that the literature of exile to 
which Said refers, one that “connotes a readily aestheti-
cizable realm,” is absent from the field of refugee studies, 
replaced instead by a focus on “refugees” as subjects of a 
“bureaucratic and international humanitarian realm.”71 
However, as Steinbock shows in his study of Casablanca, 
the romantic construct of an idealized forced migrant has 
largely informed the international legal definition of the 
refugee. The exclusion of most forced migrants from the 
protection of the international legal/bureaucratic order is 
therefore a result of the fact that the real experiences of most 
refugees simply do not conform to such an ideal-type. The 
failure of Alem as a believable protagonist is rooted in this 
phenomenon. Thus it is a category mistake to counterpose 
the aesthetic to the legal constructions of the refugee. As 
Kieran Dolin writes, “The notion that literature is a zone of 
free expression … is an idealist one … Consequently, it is 
important not to regard literature and law as ‘polar oppo-
sites,’ one a space of freedom, and the other an institution of 
social control.”72 Some way must be found out of a circular 
discourse based around the legal definition of the refugee 
and the identity of the nation-state, which continually 
returns the figure of the refugee to the filiative realm of the 
objectively good or worthy subject. But as we have seen in 
the novels discussed in this article, we should not idealize 
the capacity of literary texts to guide us in this project. 
The question of the refugee is political today only in a 
very restricted sense, framed in terms of a vague humanitar-
ian concern or in the nation-state as a project. The problem 
evidenced in Exodus and Shame is that once that project 
of becoming a nation-state is completed, the refugees that 
remain become ipso facto a non-political question. And 
in the post-colonial age this is the fate of the overwhelm-
ing majority of forced migrants. Instead, if we understand 
politics as a field of rival positions irreducible to consensus 
or a final event, then reinvigorating the refugee question 
involves remaking the refugee subject in such a way that 
it cuts across the romantic/legal construct.73 Politics in 
the sense described by Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou, 
spaces of contestation that cannot be collapsed into a singu-
lar consensus or ethics, has been edged out by a humanitar-
ianism that uses a romanticized figure of suffering as its ref-
erence point. Law, on the other hand, by creating categories 
of rights, and therefore of rights-bearing subjects, reduces 
the complexities of human beings to “the significance of a 
mathematical point, a centre in which a certain number of 
rights is concentrated.”74 In both cases the refugee appears 
as an idealized trope, which often bears little relation to 
the difficulties and complexities of the refugee experience. 
Seeking out the refugee voice is thus about reimagining and 
rehabilitating the refugee as an active subject, not simply as 
a victim of circumstances or as an ideal-type. Nevzat Soguk 
has written of “migratory horizons” in which “migrants 
make their histories as the histories of others even if ‘they 
do not make them just as they please and under circum-
stances chosen by themselves.’”75 The point is that finding 
the “true” voice of the refugee is not an end in itself, but 
rather a process of making and remaking that begins with 
recognition of the refugee as an active subject at its centre. 
The problem is that the scope for doing that has become 
very restricted, as forced migrants are forced to continually 
confront false images of the refugee constructed by law and 
the nation-state.76 Thus the seeking out of refugee voices is 
an endeavour that necessarily involves refugees being heard, 
and therefore having a chance to speak, outside of the 
frameworks of the nation-state and law. It might be objected 
that the spaces for doing that are almost impossible to find, 
or practically non-existent at present. However, by reading 
the literatures of the distant and more recent past, we can 
at least see that the refugee has existed in a multiplicity of 
guises, refreshingly distinct from the pathetic and threat-
ening figure that hegemonizes our discourse today. Yet we 
must be very wary of relying on the romanticized tropes 
found in that realm, for all too often they have reflected or 
fed into, rather than challenged, the existing delineation of 
the refugee subject.
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